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Introduction
The financial crisis of the past three years has seen a
dramatic change in the EU financial sector. Since the
early 1990s, with the completion of the internal market,
there had been a growing move towards an EU financial
services market. Banks were becoming more
international with greater regional coverage within the
EU (and the world). It was anticipated that this
integration of the European financial sector would result
in a more efficient use of capital in the EU economy, and
increased competition. In turn, this was expected to lead
to a lower cost of capital, higher investment and,
eventually, higher growth. The benefits were expected to
arise both from efficiency gains within the sector and
also from a more efficient allocation of capital across
the economy.
This evolution in the European banking structure in
many ways imitated changes in the US that had begun to
take place previously. With the introduction of the
Riegel-Neal Act (1994), the development of national as
opposed to state banks was facilitated. As a result of the
savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, there was a concern
in the US that banks which were confined to single states
were more at risk from idiosyncratic shocks affecting
individual states. For example, the Fed in Kansas City
saw a major collapse in the banking system in its district
because of shocks affecting the local economy, resulting
in major insolvencies. The response was to encourage
securitisation and geographical diversification in the
banking system – a move to bigger and more national
banks.
The current financial crisis has seen the collapse of some
banks within the EU, and many more have been either
partly or fully nationalised because of their inability to deal
with their losses. Because of the national basis of banking
regulation within the EU it has fallen to individual member
governments to rescue ‘their own’ banks:
• In the UK, the government has had to invest major
funds in rescuing Northern Rock and, more
importantly, RBS and HBOS. While the problems in
RBS arose from a takeover of a Dutch bank, ABN
Amro, it was the government of the UK, where the
banking group was headquartered, not the Dutch
government, that had to foot the bill.
• In the case of Fortis bank, responsibility was shared
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by the Belgian and Dutch governments with the bank
being broken up on national lines.
• In the case of the Irish banking system, the government
had to nationalise the biggest three national banks
and take major stakes in others.
• In Spain the government has had to rescue and
reorganise the Caja (savings) banks.
• In Germany the government had to rescue Hypo Bank
and support much of the rest of the system.
Thus the EU banking system has seen a major
involvement by national governments in capitalising
and owning banks headquartered on their territory. But
in order to expand and prosper in the future, banks will
need more capital. If the markets fail to provide this,
then either governments must provide it, or banks will
have to survive by gradually reducing the size of their
balance sheets.
A big question facing many governments and the EU
Commission is therefore whether governments will just
recapitalise banks so that they can lend in their own
territories or whether they will recapitalise them so that
they can operate across their geographical footprint. For
example, after the January 2009 EU Finance Council,
the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that
while the UK government was recapitalising RBS, he
was not sure whether they would recapitalise their
subsidiary on the island of Ireland – Ulster Bank. It
seems that, in the end, they decided to keep Ulster, as it
has had an injection of €3bn with a further €3bn to
come to keep them in business. Conversely the Danish
government, which has supported Dansk bank, appears
to have decided not to recapitalise its subsidiary on the
island of Ireland – Northern. The Irish government is
requiring AIB to sell off its UK, Polish and US interests to
provide some of the capital needed to allow the bank to
operate normally in Ireland.
This paper addresses these issues in a systematic way.
We first look at the evolving structure of the European
banking system, describing the ownership structure as it
was in 2009. We then look at how cross-border banking
activity has changed, peaking in 2007 and subsequently
declining, hinting at a trend towards re-
territorialisation. This will imply a reduction in the
average scale of banks, particularly in small economies
where governments have smaller facilities available for
supporting the banking sector and also those where
sovereign risk is higher. As small banks tend to charge
more for their loans, the user cost of capital will be
higher, which will impact on economic activity. After
reviewing the literature on EU bank structure, and on net
interest margins (NIM), we undertake an empirical
analysis of the impact of bank size on the NIM, using a
large panel of 713 banks from the BankScope database
across fourteen countries and sixteen years. Given these
estimates of size on the margin and therefore on
borrowing costs, we look at the impacts of reducing
bank size on sustainable output in the Euro Area
countries using our global model, NiGEM. It is clear
from our analysis that small countries are more
adversely affected than large ones when bank size falls.
The structure of the European banking
system
We describe trends in the structure of the European
banking system before, during and since the crisis in
terms of market structure. It appears that European
integration to date has chiefly been achieved through the
growth of foreign branches and subsidiaries and through
cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) activity,
rather than through the cross-border provision of
services. This represents a consolidation of the banking
sector internationally, and may have impacted on the
outcomes of integration, especially consumer welfare in
the EU member countries.
The primary theoretical benefit of financial integration
is increased competition; eliminating barriers in the
form of national borders increases both the size of the
market and the number of firms in the market. Increased
competition on the supply side means that banks must
improve their services in order to retain their market
share. This may take the form of improved quality or
lower costs. Furthermore, if integration takes place
through expansion of existing banks through foreign
branches and subsidiaries, or through mergers and
acquisitions, integration is analogous to an increase in
bank size. As banks grow larger, up to a certain point
they are able to take advantage of economies of scale
and scope, which reduces their own funding costs and
may allow them to operate more efficiently. In a
competitive market environment, this will induce banks
to channel these cost advantages into improved lending
rates for clients.
Commenting on empirical trends in the sector to date, a
report by the European Commission in 2005 (Walkner
and Raes, 2005) finds that in most countries a larger
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share of foreign ownership of banks is correlated with a
reduction in profitability and margins of domestically
owned banks. The report cites Levine (2003), who found
that restricting foreign bank entry boosts banks’ net
interest margins; and Lensink and Hermes (2004), who
found that foreign bank entry not only translates into
cost benefits for consumers but also enhanced service
quality, as foreign firms bring in innovative financial
services and practices. There is a possibility that over-
consolidation in the financial services market could
reduce competition and create a more monopolistic
outcome, whereby lower funding costs for banks are
channelled into profits rather than lower borrowing
costs for consumers. The report notes that, based on the
declining trends in net interest margins in the past
decade or so, this does not seem to be the case;
nevertheless we incorporate such a possibility into our
own analysis. Evidence on improvements in efficiency
was less clear-cut, possibly due to various institutional
barriers imposed by different legal and tax systems
across countries for instance, ‘preventing exploitation of
synergies in cross-border banking’ (Vander Vennet,
2002, cited in Walkner and Raes, 2005).
Walkner and Raes (2005) found that it is useful to look at
concentration ratios for measuring competition at the
domestic level. They took the asset shares of the five
largest banks in each country, and found that, with the
exceptions of Denmark, Finland and Sweden, all EU
member states saw rises in their domestic concentration
ratios. The report also looks at an alternative measure of
concentration, the Herfindahl index, which considers the
size of firms in relation to the industry by looking at the
sum of squares of each individual bank’s asset shares on
a scale of 0 to 10. Based on this, the authors found that
all EU member states except Denmark and Sweden
experienced increases. This led them to conclude that,
although domestic bank consolidation in Europe has
progressed rapidly since the introduction of the euro,
cross-border consolidation has in fact lagged behind.
Domestic M&As increase market power of individual
firms but cross-border M&As less so, and therefore the
competition benefits of financial integration may not
filter through if domestic expansion were to dominate
cross-border expansion.
A more recent European Financial Integration Report
by the European Commission (2009) reveals that the
competition benefits of integration have continued into
2009, but the recent crisis has brought a focus on
domestic activity once more to the fore of the European
banking structure. They note that EU financial
integration has brought with it benefits to both home and
host countries such as ‘increased income generation,
improvements in technology and risk management,
increased access to funds, risk diversification and
deepening of financial markets’ (EC, 2009, p. 35). All
these are signs of increased innovation, efficiency and
lower costs that have been brought about by increased
competition and foreign market entry. However, it has
been widely observed that these trends were disrupted by
the financial crisis in 2007–8. Recent research by the
European Central Bank (ECB, 2010) has found that the
domination of EU member states’ markets by domestic
banks has marginally increased since 2007 as foreign
(predominantly EU) branches decreased. Domestic credit
institutions increased their market share in 2008 (73 per
cent of total assets were domestically owned) but
decreased again in 2009. They also note that cross-
border activity was affected; intermediation and merger
and acquisition activity declined through 2007–9. The
European Commission (2009) similarly observed a
segmentation of EU financial markets, and that cross-
border (intra-EU) M&A activity was surpassed by
domestic activity in 2008 (both private and
government), representing an increased focus on
domestic markets, and a decline in the market share of
EU branches and subsidiaries.  It appears that
consolidation resumed in 2008–9, and the number of
banks in the EU diminished due to increases in merger
and acquisition activity. However, as before the crisis,
this activity was channelled mostly into domestic deals.
A significant shift in ownership structure towards
government participation has taken place in some major
EU banks.
As yet it is unclear whether the recent dynamics
observed over the crisis period are merely ‘temporary
entrenchment by market actors within domestic borders’
(EC, 2009, p. 17) or whether they actually represent a
long-term return to a more segmented and territorialised
banking structure. It seems that many of the indicators
point to this being a temporary phenomenon.
Nevertheless, recent events have called into question the
benefits of European financial integration, and though
the consensus remains that increased competition can
offer clear welfare benefits to consumers, it seems that
integration should proceed along more cautious lines. In
particular, risk management is clearly now a sensitive
issue; it was suggested before the crisis that increased
consolidation and an integrated market would lead
banks to expand their investment and lending activities
across borders, thereby diversifying their portfolios and
reducing risk. But integration can instead introduce
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other forms of risk. For instance, an overly-concentrated
banking system resulting from domestic rather than
cross-border consolidation may be subject to
idiosyncratic risk. Walkner and Raes (2005) identified
(in advance of the crisis) that foreign bank entry can
have negative consequences for macro stability if they
ex-patriate capital at signs of domestic distress, thereby
causing fragility and imposing lending restrictions on
the foreign subsidiary. Integration also exposes banking
systems to sovereign risk outside their own borders.
The EC (2009) report cites the experiences of Central,
Eastern and Southern Europe (CESE) as a case study for
the macroeconomic stability consequences of financial
integration. This area saw the largest rise in foreign
participation in domestic banking markets, but this has
actually reduced diversification and increased
concentration in individual markets. The report notes
that most CESE countries rely on western European
banks for their funding, resulting in a build-up of ‘major
concentration exposures’, whereby the use of ‘common
funding channels’ (in the CESE case, this means Austria
and Sweden) increases risk and vulnerability of the
funding channel countries to macroeconomic shocks in
the host countries. As a result of this, and the ‘lack of
adequate risk management and regulation’, the report
notes there were major imbalances in the banking
system. Furthermore, the easy access to foreign loans
which had previously been seen as conducive to
consumption and growth resulted in a speculative
property bubble. The report concludes that financial
integration has brought clear benefits, but the stability
aspects have not received enough attention.
Although it is clear from the European Commission
reports described above that consolidation across
borders is important for the competitive consequences of
integration, what also matters is domestic bank
participation in foreign markets. This captures the size
of the market on the supply side, rather than bank size.
We undertake our own analysis of the structure of the
European banking system and how it has changed from
this perspective. We firstly consider changes in national
market shares as given by the ratio of foreign claims to
total assets in the banking system; and secondly, we
consider changes in assets held by foreign branches and
subsidiaries within the EU. The first indicator shows
how cross-border lending has changed over the period
between 2000 and 2009, and the second illustrates
expansion of banks into other EU countries.
The indicator we use to analyse changes in cross-border
banking activity is the ratio of total annual reported
claims of foreign banks since 2000 to total Monetary
and Financial Institution (MFI) assets.1 Information on
foreign claims comes from the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) consolidated banking statistics, MFI
total assets from the Deutsche Bundesbank.2 We present
the ratios by country in table 1, and plot an unweighted
average across countries in figure 1 in order to illustrate
the patterns of internationalisation and re-
territorialisation of banking within Europe. Cross-
border activity clearly peaked in 2007, but this has been
reversed in the last two years of our sample.
We then used this indicator to analyse the market shares of
foreign claims in 2007 and 2009. Figure 2 plots the changes
in shares between 2007 and 2009 to illustrate recent trends.
This demonstrates that, while the share of domestic
banking in host countries has increased in the majority of
countries recently, the change in total foreign market share
of lending is negative for almost all countries in the sample,
indicating that European banking has become more
territorialised and more national since the crisis. The only
Table 1. Share of consolidated foreign claims of reporting banks over MFI total assets
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germ. Greece Ireland Italy Lux. Neths Portugal Spain UK
2000 0.29 0.49 0.31 0.64 0.21 0.14 0.69 0.72 0.37 0.72 0.43 0.41 0.23 0.31
2001 0.44 0.50 0.34 0.48 0.19 0.14 0.58 0.73 0.35 0.65 0.41 0.36 0.21 0.30
2002 0.43 0.67 0.34 0.41 0.20 0.16 0.63 0.75 0.33 0.61 0.40 0.43 0.24 0.29
2003 0.42 0.61 0.34 0.40 0.20 0.16 0.57 0.83 0.31 0.62 0.41 0.43 0.25 0.30
2004 0.43 0.62 0.49 0.81 0.21 0.18 0.61 0.86 0.31 0.68 0.40 0.45 0.27 0.35
2005 0.27 0.60 0.51 0.75 0.21 0.19 0.72 0.81 0.31 0.74 0.52 0.49 0.27 0.30
2006 0.32 0.58 0.41 0.82 0.25 0.20 0.79 0.83 0.39 0.93 0.55 0.49 0.31 0.34
2007 0.48 0.55 0.41 0.85 0.24 0.26 0.76 0.97 0.38 0.95 0.59 0.50 0.32 0.31
2008 0.41 0.58 0.34 0.80 0.20 0.24 0.69 0.86 0.33 0.96 0.48 0.49 0.30 0.27
2009 0.33 0.76 0.40 0.72 0.18 0.24 0.50 0.80 0.31 0.94 0.40 0.50 0.27 0.29
Source: BIS, Bundesbank, Bank of England and National Bank of Denmark.
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We can also look at the shares of bank assets held by
foreign branches and subsidiaries located in the 27
members of the EU over the period 2003–9, as well as the
Euro Area countries and the EU in aggregate. Assets held
by foreign branches and subsidiaries indicate the amount of
cross-border expansion of banks that has taken place
within each country. Estonia, the Czech Republic and
Luxembourg are notable for having over 90 per cent of
their bank assets held by foreign-owned banks, and hence
their domestic banking sectors are almost non-existent. At
the other end of the spectrum, larger economies such as
France, Germany, Spain and Italy have under 20 per cent
of their bank assets held by foreign-owned banks.  This
figure has not increased since 2003 for France and Spain,
whose domestic banks clearly dominate their financial
markets. The UK however has over 50 per cent of its bank
assets held by foreign branches and subsidiaries, and this
figure peaked at nearly 80 per cent in 2005; these
particularly large figures signify the importance of the UK
as a global financial centre. Cross-border activity through
firms and subsidiaries was clearly declining for most
countries through 2008 and 2009, illustrating that the
effects of the crisis impacted markedly on participation in
foreign markets.
Figure 3 plots this data, and divides it into four series
showing (i) assets held by all foreign branches and
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Figure 2. Absolute change in the market share of foreign
claims between 2007 and 2009
Source: BIS, Bundesbank, Bank of England and the National Bank of
Denmark
Figure 1. Foreign claims of banks in Europe
Source: BIS, Bundesbank, Bank of England and the National Bank of
Denmark.
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Figure 3. Shares of assets in EU banks held by foreign
branches and subsidiaries
Source: European Central Bank.
exceptions to this are Belgium, for which international
lending has surpassed domestic banking, and Portugal,
whose lending structure remains unchanged.
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subsidiaries located in the EU, (ii) assets held by other
EU branches and subsidiaries located in the EU, (iii)
assets held by non-EU branches and subsidiaries located
in the EU, and (iv) assets held by all foreign branches
and subsidiaries located in the Euro Area. The chart
illustrates that foreign-held assets peaked in 2005 in the
EU, and declined over the crisis years but have started to
pick up in 2009. By contrast, foreign-held assets peaked
in 2007 for the Euro Area, but have not experienced the
positive growth that the EU as a whole experienced in
2009. This is made clearer by figures 4 and 5, which
illustrate the absolute annual (percentage point) changes
in assets held by foreign branches and subsidiaries in the
EU and the Euro Area; this was positive for the EU in
2009 but was actually still declining in the Euro Area.
The charts also illustrate the driving forces behind recent
dynamics seen in EU financial markets. EU branches and
subsidiaries clearly make up the bulk of foreign
ownership, and hence the decline in overall foreign
banking in the EU over 2008 was driven chiefly by the
decline in EU branches and subsidiaries (and almost
entirely by those in the Euro Area).
Given that borrowing costs have been falling since the
1990s, we can conclude that the growth in cross-border
banking activity through foreign lending and expansion
of foreign branches and subsidiaries within the EU has
translated into welfare benefits for consumers. This
finding is in accordance with the European Commission
and European Central Bank reports described above.
The cost of funds
As noted, EU banking integration has taken place
mainly through merger and acquisition activity and
through the expansion of services in other EU countries
through branches and subsidiaries. Both of these modes
imply growth in the size of banks, and therefore
integration can be seen through the perspective of firm
size. The key significance that firm size has in the
banking sector is the cost of funds; this is the channel
through which banking activity influences the economy.
However the direction of this influence depends on the
amount of market power banks have, as in oligopolistic
or monopolistic markets they may not pass on lower
costs to consumers. Hence we analyse the relationship
between bank size (often measured by asset size) and the
net interest margin (NIM), starting with a review of the
relevant literature. The NIM is the spread between a
financial institution’s gross earnings on interest-bearing
assets and its interest expenses in funding those assets. It
Figure 5. Absolute annual changes in the shares of assets
in EU banks held by foreign branches and subsidiaries for
the Euro Area
Source: European Central Bank.
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Figure 4. Absolute annual changes in the shares of assets
in EU banks held by foreign branches and subsidiaries for
the EU
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can be decomposed into several components – profits,
operational costs, regulatory costs and potential costs of
default. Each of the components responds to either
cyclical or structural shocks, or both. Consequently, it is
one of several measures of bank profitability, but
moreover captures the functioning of banks generally in
terms of efficiency and competitiveness, which in turn
impacts on saving, investment and therefore growth
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999, p. 2). The
relationship between the NIM and bank size may
consequently be driven by two factors; the earnings side
of the spread and the costs side.
With regards to the first, the lending activity of small
banks tends to be channelled into small business or
personal loans which generate higher yields than larger
loans, due to the associated higher expected losses and
transaction costs. Furthermore, small banks tend to hold
a larger percentage of their asset mix in such loans than
in lower-yield investment securities. Large banks, on the
other hand, are more able to take advantage of
economies of scale, and also perhaps economies of scope
in their more diverse array of products. This enables
them to offer larger loans at more competitive rates. In
addition, they tend to hold a higher proportion of their
assets in lower-risk corporate or government bonds.
Considering the other side of the spread, small banks
often have lower funding costs as they rely on low-
interest core deposits, whereas large banks tend to be
dependent on costly and more volatile wholesale
funding which is closely linked to the official bank rate.
The combination of these characteristics means that the
NIM tends to be larger for small banks.
Figure 6 plots the average NIMs across banks in a
selection of advanced economies between 1993 and
2008. On the whole, NIMs have been falling throughout
this period, indicating that banks may have become
larger in these countries or that competition has
increased. It may also suggest that banks have been able
to lower costs and pass these on to consumers. The crisis
years of 2007 and 2008 saw a fairly drastic upwards
surge in average NIMs in the European countries
depicted and in the US and, if the size–NIM relationship
proffered above were to hold, this would indicate a
sudden downsizing of banks in response to the crisis.
NIMs in Japan and Canada surged in the opposite
direction however.
Much of the literature on net interest margins attempts
to identify its determinants using an analytical
framework that was first developed by Ho and Saunders
(1981), in which they modelled bank interest margins as
a function of managerial risk aversion, the size of bank
transactions, bank market structure and the variance of
interest rates. Since then, there have been a number of
developments, including a paper by Demirgüç-Kunt and
Huizinga (1999), who tested a variety of banking,
macroeconomic, regulatory, structural and institutional
characteristics as determinants of bank interest margins.
They find that larger bank asset to GDP ratios and lower
market concentration ratios lead to lower interest
margins (substantiating the inverse size-NIM
relationship), and more notably perhaps that foreign
ownership is associated with higher NIMs (this is more
pronounced in developing countries).
Recent literature has begun to look more specifically at
the relationship between bank size and the NIM, much
of this focusing on Europe as the internationalisation of
its banking sector in the five years or so up to 2000
provides an interesting forum for such investigation.
Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004) analyse the
determinants of the NIM in Germany, France, the UK,
Italy and Spain, and find that declining margins in the
European banking sector over the period 1993–2000 can
be explained by increased market power and
concentration as well as interest rate risk, credit risk,
operating expenses and bank risk aversion. Market
power, concentration and decreased competition are all
Figure 6. Trends in banks’ net interest margins, 1993–
2008
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associated with the banking sector becoming more
oligopolistic (i.e. fewer, but bigger banks). This
substantiates the findings of the EC and ECB reports with
respect to how bank size affects the NIM, but goes
contrary to what theory suggests regarding the impact of
reduced competition on margins.
Kasman et al. (2010) investigate this topic further by
examining the effects of bank consolidation in the new
European Union members and candidate economies on the
determinants of the NIM over two sub-periods, comprising
the consolidation period of 1995–2000 and the post-
consolidation period of 2001–6. In accordance with the
conclusions of the Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara
paper, Kasman et al. note that the European banking
structure over the entire time period examined was
characterised by the cross-border expansion of financial
intermediaries and by a ‘wave of mergers and
acquisitions…[leading to] a reduction in the number of
banks in many old and new member countries’ (Kasman et
al., 2010, p. 649). They find that both bank size and
managerial efficiency are significant and exhibit a negative
relationship with the NIM over both sub-periods,
suggesting that this relationship was robust to the structural
changes that took place over this time period.
Econometric analysis
We approach the same question as that tackled by
Kasman et al., which is how the NIM is affected by bank
size in Europe in the consolidation period since the
1990s. However we have a dual purpose, which is not
only to quantify this relationship but furthermore to use
these results to show what would be the economic
impact if the recent trend of re-territorialisation and
fragmentation of the banking system that was briefly
observed through 2007–8 was to continue. We estimate
the relationship between bank size and the NIM (where
the NIM is approximated by the ratio of net interest
revenues to total assets) and model the NIM as a
function of cyclical and structural factors.
The set of variables we include in our regression are
GDP growth and the real growth of loans, which both
capture cyclical fluctuations, the capital adequacy ratio,
which is an instrument of regulatory policy, the lagged
NIM, and bank size. We use micro data for total assets
and loans, and the (risk-adjusted) total capital ratio, all
from the Bankscope database over the period 1993–
2008. Our sample excludes central banks, specialised
governmental credit institutions and multi-lateral
government banks. Macroeconomic data for inflation,
GDP growth and house prices are obtained from
national sources as collected in the NIESR NiGEM
database.
We use a normalised bank size variable (see Barrell et
al., 2010). We calculated the mean and the standard
deviation of the bank assets across all countries in each
year, and then scaled each bank by the number of
standard deviations of its assets from the mean. This
accounts for increasing density in the time domain, as
the number of banks in our sample rises over time, and
hence it is possible that there is a downward trend in
average share. Using the NIM as the dependent
variable, we estimate over the period 1993–2008 using
Ordinary Least Squares. Results of estimation are shown
in table 2.
The estimation confirms the results of previous studies
reviewed above, namely that bank size negatively
affects the NIM; the bigger the bank, the greater its
economies of scale and the lower its costs, which allows
it to reduce the differential between the lending and the
deposit rate. Conversely, the capital adequacy ratio has
a positive effect on the NIM, as it increases bank costs.
GDP growth and the real growth of loans mirror cyclical
fluctuations in the margin, both through profits as well
as the potential costs of the default. The default costs can
be decomposed into those related to cycle-dependent
systemic risk, and those related to bank-size-dependent
individual risk (as a bank’s portfolio increases, the
individual risk falls – and with banks getting larger the
probability of a bank having a more diversified portfolio
increases). Both GDP and the real growth of loans have
a positive effect on the NIM, indicating that it is
procyclical.
As noted previously, our central premise that bigger
banks can exploit economies of scale in portfolio
Table 2. Regression results
Net interest revenues/total assets
coefficient t-statistic
Lagged dependent (NIM(–1)) 0.95 187.94
GDP growth (–1) 0.009 2.02
Real loan growth (–1) 0.003 7.66
Capital adequacy (–1) 0.003 3.11
Size (normalised) (–1) –0.006 –1.99
Observations 4374
Banks 588
Notes: Fourteen countries in sample, including US and Japan. Two
banks dummied out in 2008.
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pooling and thus reduce their NIM holds under perfect
competition. However, as bank size increases,
monitoring costs may start to rise, and the bank may
start behaving as a monopolist. Both of these may mean
that margins start to increase above some size threshold.
To capture this nonlinearity in the size–NIM
relationship, we augment the baseline regression with
our bank size variable squared.
The results confirm that, as banks get bigger, they can
exploit their increasing market power and also gain
from the economies of pooling risk which they pass on to
their customers. The relative role of market power is
limited however; as bank size increases, bank margins
fall until banks are more than four standard deviations
above the mean of bank size, which is around 0.15 per
cent of the global total. We have computed the threshold
bank size above which diseconomies of scale could start
playing a role. This value is time-dependent, and also
depends on the number of banks in the world banking
system. In 2008, if the total assets of a bank exceeded 2.3
per cent of the total assets in the world banking system,
the bank could have been considered too big. There was
at least one bank in each of the US, UK, Germany,
France, Japan and the Netherlands, whose assets
exceeded 2.3 per cent of the global assets in 2008. We
can examine the effects of different banking systems on
the EU economy using our global econometric model,
NiGEM.
The structure of the NiGEM model
The National Institute Global Econometric Model
(NiGEM) is structured around the national income
identity, can accommodate forward-looking consumer
behaviour, and has many of the characteristics of a
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
model. Unlike a pure DSGE model however, NiGEM is
based on estimation using historical data. What follows
is a description of its structural properties.
Production and price setting
The major country models rely on an underlying
constant-returns-to-scale CES production function with
labour-augmenting technical progress.
Q s K s Le t= + −− − −γ ρ λ ρ ρ[ ( ) ( )( ) ] /1 1 (1)
where is Q is real output, K is the total capital stock, L is
total hours worked and t is an index of labour-
augmenting technical progress. This constitutes the
theoretical background for the specifications of the
factor demand equations, forms the basis for unit total
costs and provides a measure of capacity utilisation,
which then feed into the price system. Barrell and Pain
(1997) show that the elasticity of substitution is
estimated from the labour demand equation, and in
general it is around 0.5. Demand for labour and capital
are determined by profit maximisation of firms,
implying that the long-run labour–output ratio depends
on real wage costs and technical progress, while the
long-run capital–output ratio depends on the real user
cost of capital
Ln L s
Q t w p
( ) [ ln{ ( )} ( )ln( )]
ln( ) ( ) ln( / )
= − − −
+ − − −
σ β σ γ
σ λ σ
1 1
1 (2)
Ln K s
Q c p
( ) [ ln( ) ( )ln( )]
ln( ) ln( / )
= − −
+ −
σ β σ γ
σ
1
(3)
where w/p is the real wage and c/p is the real user cost of
capital. The user cost of capital is defined as:
c r IPREM CTAXR
r PREM CTAXR
= − + −
+ + + −
[( )*( )*( )
*( ) ] /( )
1 1
1
μ
μ θ  (4)
Equation (4) shows that the user cost of capital is
influenced by corporate taxes (CTAXR) and depreciation
( )θ , and is a weighted average of the cost of equity
finance and the margin adjusted long real rate (r), with
weights that vary with the size of equity markets ( )μ  as
compared to the private sector capital stock. Hence the
investment premium (IPREM) directly feeds into firms’
borrowing costs and thus their investment decisions.
The NiGEM model contains a description of the banking
sector as in Barrell, Davis and Kirby (2010). Bank net
Table 3. Regression results with nonlinearity variable
included
Net interest revenues/total assets
coefficient t-statistic
Lagged dependent (NIM(–1)) 0.95 184.01
GDP growth (–1) 0.01 2.26
Real loan growth (–1) 0.003 7.63
Capital adequacy (–1) 0.003 2.71
Size (normalised) (–1) –0.02 –3.46
Size (normalised)^2 (–1) 0.003 3.21
Observations 4374
Banks 588
Notes: See table 2.
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interest margins feed into the behaviour of individuals
and firms through the wedge between borrowing and
lending rates. Individuals face LENDW as their spread,
and firms face CORPW as theirs. Our work suggests that
corporate borrowing spreads charged by banks and bond
market premia for corporates move together. We can
simulate the effects of changes in bank scale by raising
LENDW and CORPW in line with any presumed
changes in Net Interest Margins.
Consumption, personal income and wealth
Consumption decisions are presumed to depend on real
disposable income and real wealth in the long run, and
follow the pattern discussed in Barrell and Davis (2007).
Total wealth is composed of both financial wealth and
tangible (housing) wealth where the latter data is
available.
   ln( ) ln( ) ( )ln( )C RPDI RFN RTW= + + − +α β β1 (5)
where C is real consumption, RPDI is real personal
disposable income, RFN is real net financial wealth and
RTW is real tangible wealth. The NIM feeds into the
consumption decision through real disposable income,
which comprises wages, government transfers and
receipts on interest-bearing assets owned by the
household sector net of borrowing costs. An increase in
the NIM indicates a rise in the cost of borrowing, and it
therefore reduces real disposable income, impacting
negatively on the consumption decision.
The dynamics of adjustment to the long run are largely
data based, and differ between countries to take account
of differences in the relative importance of types of
wealth and of liquidity constraints.
Financial markets
We generally assume that exchange rates are forward
looking, and ‘jump’ when there is news. The size of the
jump depends on the expected future path of interest
rates and risk premia, solving an uncovered interest
parity condition.
RX t RX t rh ra rprx( ) ( )[( ) /( )]( )= + + + +1 1 1 1 (6)
where RX is the exchange rate, rh is the home interest
rate set in line with a policy rule, ra is the interest rate
abroad and rprx is the risk premium. Nominal short-
term interest rates are set in relation to a standard
forward-looking feedback rule, as discussed in Barrell,
Hall and Hurst (2006). Forward-looking long rates are
related to expected future short-term rates,
( ) ( ) /l LR l SRt j l
T
t j
l T+ = +
= +Π (7)
We assume that bond and equity markets are also
forward looking, and long-term interest rates are a
forward convolution of expected short-term interest
rates. Forward-looking equity prices are determined by
the discounted present value of expected profits.
The economic impact of banking system
restructuring
Having established the inverse relationship between
bank size and the net interest margin, we now use the
NIM to proxy bank downsizing, in order to analyse the
impact on output. If banks re-territorialise then the NIM
will increase, and will increase the most in small
countries because we have a quadratic impact from size
on margins, and its impact is steepest for smaller sizes of
country. We may write the relationship between the
change in size and the NIM as the derivative of the
equation in table 3 with respect to size, where D(NIM) is
the change in the net interest margin. Table 3 yields the
equation,
NIM a SIZE SIZE
c X e
= − +
+ +
ˆ . * . *
ˆ * ˆ
0 44 0 052 2
(8)
where cˆ  represents a vector of the remaining estimated
parameters, and X the remaining explanatory variables
in the equation. Hence,
D(NIM) = –0.44 + 0.104* SIZE (9)
If we reduce bank size in Germany, France, Italy and
Spain by two standard deviations, then the NIM will rise
by 100 basis points. The largest bank would then be
below the maximum efficient scale rather than above it
as is the case now. We reduce bank size by twice this in
the small countries, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal,
Greece, Austria and Finland, and given the scale of the
Irish banking system relative to its GDP we reduce the
average size of banks by an additional amount of the
same size. The effects on output are shown in figure 7.
We assume that financial markets are forward looking,
and equity prices and long-term interest rates jump after
a shock. This is because the monetary authorities react
to the shock and change interest rates and markets react
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to these changes. We also assume that labour bargains
take account of future inflation. Governments set their
taxes in order to remain solvent and so when revenues
fall, tax rates rise. Furthermore, we assume consumers
are myopic and not forward looking. We apply shocks
only to Euro Area countries.
There are three sets of factors that affect the long-run
impacts on output. Countries with higher capital–output
ratios will have larger effects as compared to others, and
as a result the effect in Germany is particularly large.
However, the long-run effects come through the user cost
of capital, and this is the weighted average of equity,
bank and bond finance. We are only raising the cost of
non-equity finance, and hence France has less effect
because private and market equity finance are more
important there than in the other large economies. Italy
has the largest effect because it has the least developed
equity market of the four large economies, and this is
reflected in the weights in our user cost equation. Apart
from France, the decline in banking sector scale
economies reduces equilibrium output by almost 1 per
cent. The long-run effects on Greece, Portugal, Austria
and Finland are twice as large as this as they are also
relatively bank dependent and the shock is twice as large
as their banks shrink. The Dutch and Belgians are less
reliant on bank finance, and hence the long-run impact
of a similar shock is smaller. Ireland faces an even larger
increase in margins but, as it is more similar to the UK,
with a relatively strong reliance on equity finance, the
impacts are muted and are the same size as the bank-
dependent small economies.
If bank margins were to be increased in this way, these
calculations suggest that growth in the Euro Area would
be reduced by 0.2 percentage points a year for five
years. The short-run effects depend upon the speed of
adjustment of the capital stock and on the level of gross
borrowing in the economy. If the personal sector has
large borrowing as compared to income then a rise in
borrowing costs on deposits that is not reflected in
income will reduce consumption and demand quickly.
Levels of personal sector debt are high in Spain, and
adjust more quickly than in other large economies.
However if an economy is small and open then most of
the effects leak out into imports, as in Ireland, the
Netherlands and Belgium, where borrowing has been
high, and where income adjusts slowly. However, the
overall output in these economies is likely to be larger
than average, as we can see from figure 7.
Conclusion
The Single Market in Financial Services has meant that
banks could become larger in scale, and hence
borrowing costs for consumers and for firms will have
been lower. We have shown that banks within Europe
increased in size and became more international, at least
until 2007 when that process went into reverse. We have
used a micro data set to investigate the impact of size on
banks’ net interest margin, and have shown that larger
banks have smaller spreads between borrowing and
lending rates for firms and households. As we have
competition between deposit takers, this largely reflects
the fact that they charge their borrowers less. Lower
borrowing costs for households raise their incomes and
their consumption, whilst for firms lower borrowing
costs mean that they raise their investment and this in
turn will raise sustainable output. Lower borrowing
costs reduce the user cost of capital, and hence increase
the equilibrium capital stock, and this would also raise
sustainable output. A 1 percentage point reduction in
borrowing costs would raise Euro Area output by ½ per
cent within four years and by ¾  per cent in the long run.
However, this gain from size must also be weighed up
against the increase in risky behaviour that is associated
with larger banks, as shown by Barrell, Davis, Fic and
Karim (2010).
Figure 7. Effects of raising IPREM and NIM due to de-
crease in bank size, percentage difference in output from
base, 2011
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After looking at the effects of bank size on borrowing
costs, we investigate the potential impact of banks
moving back into their home territory. In summary, re-
territorialisation implies that banks will become
smaller, and economies will shrink. We investigate the
impacts on output in large and small countries showing
that the effects are generally larger in small countries,
and also larger in economies that are more dependent on
bank finance for their business investment decisions.
Our simulations suggest that overall, Euro Area growth
would be 0.2 per cent per annum lower for a few years.
Competition in banking in the European Single Market
in Financial Services has brought benefits and raised
output, especially in the smaller economies. However,
poor regulation at the Area level and the ‘too big to fail’
guarantee have meant that the costs may have
outweighed the benefits.
NOTES
1 Includes banks whose ultimate owners are located in
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Chinese
Taipei, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Panama, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, and the US. It is
necessary to note that ownership is defined here by
headquarter location as opposed to shareholder
characteristics.
2 Data for Denmark and the United Kingdom were obtained
from their respective central banks.
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